

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 058830

44

ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-10 NSC-07 NSCE-00 PM-03

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00 AEC-05 SAJ-01

OMB-01 NEA-06 L-02 IO-03 PRS-01 SAM-01 /076 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/IR: PSEMLER; LFISHDCHER

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR: RHMILLER

ACDA/IR: DLINEBAUGH

PM: SWEISS

EUR/RPM: AFLOYD

OSD/ISA: COL. L.MICHAEL

JCS/J-5: BGEN. GEORGI

----- 070198

P R 231603Z MAR 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T STATE 058830

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT; MARCH 18 TRILATERAL DISCUSSION ON MBFR NUCLEAR
ISSUES

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

GENEVA FOR SALTDEL

1. SUMMARY. US, UK, AND FRG REPS MET FOR DAY-LONG TRI-
LATERAL CONSULTATIONS MARCH 18 ON NUCLEAR ISSUES IN MBFR.
WHILE UK AND FRG REPS DID NOT SPEAK FOR GOVERNMENTS, THEY
APPEARED TO ACCEPT PRINCIPLE OF AN OFFER OF SOME NUCLEAR
ELEMENTS TO ACHIEVE MBFR OBJECTIVES, BUT WITH EXTENSIVE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 058830

RESERVATIONS AS TO HOW, AND RELATION TO WHAT QUID.

MAIN REMAINING ISSUES WERE: INCLUSION OF AIRCRAFT; RECIPROCAL LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS; TACTICS FOR ALLIANCE AGREEMENT; WHETHER THE NUCLEAR PACKAGE SHOULD BE INTRODUCED PIECEMEAL OR IN ONE LUMP; AND WHETHER A PORTION OF US NUCLEAR PACKAGE SHOULD BE HELD IN RESERVE FOR PHASE II .

2. ON MARCH 18, ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE CHAIRED FULL DAY'S DISCUSSION WITH FRG AND UK REPS ON MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUES. UK DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY FCO WESTERN ORGANIZATIONS CHIEF TICKELL, FRG DELEGATION BY DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH.

3. IN OPENING STATEMENT, DR. IKLE STRESSED THAT PURPOSE
3. IN OPENING STATEMENT, DR. IKLE STRESSED THAT PURPOSE IN HOLDING TALKS WAS TO HAVE FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. US POSITION WAS IN NO SENSE FROZEN IN CONCRETE. THE OBJECTIVES IN MBFR REMAINED TO CHANGE THE CHARACTER AND THE LEVEL OF THE CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE HAD COME UP WITH THE MBFR NUCLEAR OPTION 3 AS A MEANS TO OBTAIN SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY, WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE OF FORCES. BRITISH AND FRG HAD RAISED VALID QUESTIONS WHICH WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS.

4. AT OUTSET OF DISCUSSION UK POINTED OUT THAT NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO STUDY MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUES. UK VIEWS WERE THEREFORE THOSE OF DELEGATION RATHER THAN UK GOVERNMENT, TO WHICH QUESTION OF WHETHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN MBFR WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT SOON. AMBASSADOR ROTH SAID THAT FRG GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO NOT TAKEN A FORMAL POSITION ON THESE ISSUES.

5. US EXPLAINED THAT OUR STUDY HAD LED TO COMPONENTS OF NUCLEAR OPTION WHICH COMBINED TWO ESSENTIAL FEATURES WE WANTED: SOMETHING WE COULD BARGAIN WITH ON THE ONE HAND AND WHICH WAS MILITARILY TOLERABLE ON THE OTHER.

6. TACTICS. IKLE SAID US HAD NO FIRM POSITION ON
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 058830

WHETHER NUCLEAR ELEMENTS SHOULD BE INTRODUCED PIECEMEAL OR IN A SINGLE PACKAGE. UK AND FRG FAVORED THE PIECEMEAL APPROACH.

7. QUID PRO QUO. TICKELL QUESTIONED WHETHER OUR NUCLEAR OPTION SHOULD NOT BE USED TO BUY MORE THAN A TANK ARMY. ONCE WE INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WE WOULD HAVE BROUGHT "RABBITS INTO AUSTRALIA". WE

NEEDED A BETTER QUID PRO QUO. NUCLEAR PACKAGE, HE SUGGESTED, MUST APPLY TO THE WHOLE OF MBFR NOT JUST TO PHASE I. THE UK DOES NOT WANT ALL NUCLEAR AMUNITION SPENT ON PHASE I; SOMETHING SHOULD BE HELD IN RESERVE FOR PHASE II. WEISS (PM) EXPLAINED THAT WHILE NUCLEAR OPTION WAS TIED TO SOVIET TANK ARMY AS PART OF PHASE I, IT ALSO WOULD REQUIRE SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING PRINCIPLE AS THE OBJECTIVE OF PHASE II. AS SUCH, IT HAD IMPORTANT POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR PHASE II. IKLE NOTED THE COMPOSITION OF PHASE II HAD NOT BEEN CONSIDERED, INCLUDING ITS EQUIPMENT CONTENT.

8. PRECEDENT. UK AND FRG WERE CONCERNED THAT NUCLEAR PACKAGE IN PHASE I COULD SET PRECEDENTS FOR PHASE II.

THEY POINTED OUT THAT SOVIETS COULD QUITE PROPERLY DEMAND FURTHER NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS TO "COMPENSATE" FOR ASYMMETRICAL WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS REQUIRED IN PHASE II TO REACH COMMON CEILING. US SIDE AGREED A DANGER DID EXIST, ALTHOUGH WE CITED SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PHASE I AND II WHICH MADE EXISTENCE OF A PRECEDENT LESS THAN A CERTAINTY.

9. CEILING. UK REPS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT US NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS NEED TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY SOME FORM OF LIMITATION ON THE CORRESPONDING SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. THEY FAVORED A FREEZE ON THE SOVIET DELIVERY SYSTEMS CORRESPONDING TO THE US SYSTEMS, A FREEZE AND/OR REDUCTION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS, AND SPECIFIC REFERENCE IN THE AGREEMENT TO SOVIET DELIVERY SYSTEMS ORGANIC TO AND REDUCED WITH THE SOVIET TANK ARMY. THEY FELT SOME SUCH LIMITATION WAS ESSENTIAL FOR POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY, SINCE PUBLIC MUST SEE BOTH SIDES AS WILLING TO ACCEPT NUCLEAR LIMITATIONS. THE GERMANS AGREED WITH GENERAL SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 058830

IDEA OF RECIPROCITY, BUT WERE RELUCTANT TO SPECIFY ORGANIC WEAPONS BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBERS OF EUROPEAN EQUIVALENTS OR TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO ANY SPECIFIC TRADE OFF. THEY ALSO SEEMED TO AGREE WITH A US COMMENT THAT A FOCUS ON NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS ON BOTH SIDES WOULD SUGGEST TO SOME A CREATION OF A DENUCLEARIZED ZONE IN THE NGA. IKLE SAID THE US HAD NO FIXED POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF RECIPROCAL LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS.

10. AIRCRAFT. UK MADE POINT WITH GENERAL SUPPORT FROM FRG THAT IF WE WANTED TO INTRODUCE AIRCRAFT INTO MBFR DISCUSSIONS, WE SHOULD NOT PUT OUR BEST BARGAINING CARD-THE F-4S-INTO A NUCLEAR PACKAGE. IF WE DID NOT WANT TO INTRODUCE AIRCRAFT GENERALLY INTO MBFR, THEN DISCUSSING F-4S AS PART OF A NUCLEAR PACKAGE RAISED THE DANGER THAT

AIRCRAFT WOULD ENTER INTO THE DISCUSSIONS. AIRCRAFT SHOULD NOT BE MIXED UP WITH NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. UK NOTED THAT AIRCRAFT IMBALANCE IS NOT AS BAD AS WE PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT (APPARENTLY REFERRING TO SGTA/DOAE ANALYSIS) UK IS OPEN TO ARGUMENTS FOR OR AGAINST INCLUDING AIRCRAFT IN THE MBFR DISCUSSIONS. FRG WAS EQUALLY BEARISH ON THIS ISSUE, PERCEIVING MANY COMPLEXITIES WHICH SUGGEST IT GENERALLY UNDESIRABLE TO INJECT AIRCRAFT.

11. QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS. THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT AMONG ALL PARTICIPANTS THAT MBFR SHOULD NOT RESULT IN QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS WHICH WOULD HINDER IMPROVEMENT OF EXISTING FORCES.

12. VERIFICATION. IKLE GAVE THE US VIEW THAT WE WOULD NOT PLAN TO ASK FOR SPECIAL VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE US NUCLEAR OPTION EVEN IF RECIPROCAL CEILINGS ON SOVIET ELEMENTS WERE INCLUDED. HE NOTED THAT PRESENT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS COULD ADEQUATELY VERIFY THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS, BUT CONCEDED THAT WARHEADS WOULD BE IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY. THE UK THOUGHT AN UNVERIFIABLE WARHEAD REDUCTION WOULD SET A BAD PRECEDENT.

13. SALT. US STATED THAT THE US NUCLEAR PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE NO NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OUR SALT POSITION AND MIGHT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 058830

EVEN REINFORCE THE CASE THAT TACTICAL SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT BE DEALT WITH TOGETHER WITH CENTRAL SYSTEMS. THE UK REPS AGREED THIS WAS A POSSIBLE OUTCOME BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIETS MISINTERPRETING THE PROPOSAL AS A SIGN OF US WEAKENING ON THE ISSUE. HOWEVER AFTER SOME DISCUSSION THEY TENDED TO AGREE THERE WOULD BE NO DAMAGE IF THE US STOOD FIRM ON FBS IN SALT.

14. ALLIANCE CONSULTATION. US GAVE VIEW THAT THE US PROPOSAL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE ALLIANCE IN A RESTRICTED NAC SESSION, WITH NO DISCUSSIONS OUTSIDE THE NAC AND PERHAPS SACEUR. WE FURTHER SUGGESTED THE PROPOSAL MIGHT BE IN THE FORM OF DRAFT GUIDANCE TO THE AHG. THE UK REPS SUGGESTED THAT EVEN IF THE UK AND THE FRG BROADLY SUPPORTED THE US PROPOSAL, THE NAC WOULD WANT THE SPC TO CONSIDER IT. THIS MIGHT REQUIRE TWO SPC MEETINGS, THEN A FINAL NAC MEETING. MOREOVER, BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE MATERIAL INVOLVED, THEY SUGGESTED THE US PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT BE TOO SPECIFIC ABOUT NUMBERS, TACTICS, AND TIMING. FOLLOWING NAC APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE OF THE PROPOSAL, AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIFIC DETAILED GUIDANCE COULD BE GIVEN QUICKLY AT A RESTRICTED NAC

SESSION JUST BEFORE THE PROPOSAL WAS TO BE USED IN VIENNA.
THE FRG REPS GENERALLY AGREED WITH THE UK BUT STRESSED
THE NEED FOR MORE CONSULTATION BEFORE GOING TO THE NAC.
TICKELL AGREED AND PROPOSED ANOTHER TRILATERAL MEETING BE
HELD BEFORE GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS BECAME FIRM. IKLE
INDICATED WE WOULD RESPOND TO THIS AT A LATER DATE.

15. FULL MEMCON ALONG WITH UK PAPER ENTITLED "NUCLEAR
ASPECTS OF MBFR" BEING POUCHED TO ADDRESSEES. UK SAID
THAT PAPER REFLECTED "WHAT THEY THOUGHT BEFORE THEY HAD
DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES WITH US." KISSINGER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NUCLEAR ENERGY, DISARMAMENT, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MEETING DELEGATIONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 MAR 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE058830
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: PSEMLER; LFISHDCHER
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740063-0043
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740319/aaaaarua.tel
Line Count: 234
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MARCH 18 TRILATERAL DISCUSSION ON MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUES
TAGS: PARM, GE, US, NATO
To: BONN LONDON
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005